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The Bank Financing of
Small Unlisted Firms in the UK:
An Analysis of Recent Conflicts
Kevin Keasey
Robert Watson

This paper examines the characteristics of UK small firm bank finance and
the causes of the frequently strained relationship between small firms and
banks in the UK. Debt, credit rationing, and call option problems under the
UK system are examined. The bank’s solutions including the potentially
harmfiil “secured overdraft system” are then considered. It is argued that the
majority of solutions tried by the banking system led to a heightened conflict
of interest between small firms and banks during the recent recession due to
the banks’ loan restructuring to avoid unneccessary risk.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the bank financing of UK small businesses and the
institutional factors responsible for the frequently strained relationships
between the two parties. An apparently perennial strain upon UK small
firm/bank relationships has been the perception that ‘credit rationing’
exists (the so-called ‘finance gap’), particularly in relation to long term
finance, and that there has been a lack of transparency regarding the
pricing and assessment by the banks of their small business lending risks.
Of course, it is probably inevitable that some element of ‘credit rationing’
will arise simply as a consequence of conflicts of interest and costly to
remedy asymmetric information (the problem of agency costs).
Nevertheless, it is argued that additional tensions between UK small
firms and banks in the early 1990s were generated by three factors;
namely, the recent macroeconomic instability and regulatory changes
outside of either party’s control, the particular type of debt financing
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(the ‘overdraft’ system) used and the oligopolistic banking market and
associated bureaucratic organizational structures of UK banks.
Throughout their history the four main UK clearing banks have been
primarily retail deposit takers specialising in holding government debt
and the provision of short term advances. Consequently, unlike the
“investment banking” systems of many other European countries, the UK
clearing banks were never involved in any major way with supplying
long-term debt or equity finance to UK industry (see Collins, 1991). In
addition, the small firm sector has historically been a relatively minor
component of both the UK economy and the banks’ lending portfolios.
Until the 1980s, domestic competition between banks for small business
custom was very limited and lending decisions were typically at the
discretion of the local branch manager. As predominantly retail deposit
takers, the branch level of UK clearing banks does not normally contain
specialist personnel competent in small business risk assessment. Branch
managers, rather than committing valuable resources to detailed
assessments of individual small business risks, have generally been
content to make available short-term advances secured on the business
and personal assets of owner-managers.
\ ^ i l e the domestic UK banking system has been opened up to much
greater competition since the mid 1980s, the majority of advances made
by the main clearing banks to small business continues to be
predominantly in the form of secured overdrafts (line-of-credit) and, to a
lesser extent, other forms of short-term loans (see Keasey & Watson,
1995) for a review of the empirical evidence). Though legally repayable
on demand, in practice the overdraft is a significant source of long-term
finance since the banks do not normally reduce previously agreed limits
for accounts in good order. Thus, the overdraft is a more-or-less
permanent, though variable, item on many small firm balance sheets.
The severe economic downturn in the UK in 1990, however,
produced complaints from small businesses that the banks had begun to
unilaterally withdraw or significantly reduce previously agreed overdraft
facilities at short notice and without just cause. Since in the majority of
cases, the firm is unable to raise the cash resources to immediately repay
the overdraft, it is forced into liquidation. As the overdraft is normally
secured via a floating charge on the firm’s assets, upon liquidation the
banks are able, via their secured creditor status, to obtain full repayment
ahead of all other (non-statutory) third party claims. While from the
banks’ viewpoint, this simply involves the exercise of their put option in
order to recover their investment when they perceive that default
probability has increased significantly, small business representatives.
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politicians and media commentators have generally interpreted the
banks’ actions as destructive and as forcing viable businesses into
unnecessary liquidation.
Although several official inquires have found no evidence of bank
misbehaviour (e.g., see the “Bank C leaned...,” 1991; “Office of Fair
T rading...,” 1991; and “Research Retakes...,” 1992), it is argued below
that the UK banks reluctance to expend resources in the monitoring and
assessment of firm-specific risk and to simply rely upon the put option
characteristics of the secured overdraft, contributed to the conflict.
However, other contributory factors can also be identified. These
include the large increase in the number of (often economically
marginal) enterprises created during the 1980s, the greatly increased
domestic and international competition confronting the UK banks over
the same period and the economic downturn in 1990 which falsified the
assumptions upon which previous lending decisions had been based. As
the proportion of small firms experiencing financial difficulties increased
dramatically after 1990, the ability of the banks to respond in a manner
which accurately reflected changes in their exposure to individual, firm
specific, risks was limited due to organizational and cultural constraints
internal to themselves.
The rem ainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
briefly describes recent changes in the UK small firm sector and the
organizational characteristics of the owner-managed firm which
exacerbated the inherent agency conflicts associated with debt financing.
Section III discusses, with particular reference to small firms, the call
option characteristics of equity which exposes the debt supplier to
uncompensated, ex post, business risk. This section also reviews the
theoretical asymmetric information credit rationing literature and the
UK banks’ traditional solution to these agency problems. In Section IV
we discuss how the structure of banking in the UK, along with the
marked macroeconomic instability of recent years, has impacted upon
the small firm/bank relationship. The final section considers the
implications of the discussions for the relationships between small firms
and banks in the UK.
II.

THE UK SMALL FIRM SECTOR

Although the small firm sector has become an increasingly important
part of the UK economy over recent years (see Stanworth & Gray,
1991) it is generally recognized that investors in small enterprises will
invariably be exposed to a high level of business risk. Indeed, as a
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consequence of the government’s financial deregulation initiatives and
its promotion of the small firm sector during the boom years of the late
1980s, the UK economy had by 1990 a greatly increased number of
young and highly levered firms (see Bank of England, 1991; Keasey &
Watson, 1992). Failure rates are particularly high for new firms, those
developing radically new products and/or those producing for new
markets. Typically, the vulnerability of firms to failure is recognized as
being greatest in their earlier years; for example, Ganguly (1983),
based upon official Value Added Tax (VAT) data, found that of those
firms formed in any year 12 percent will fail in their first year, 26
percent within two years and 36 percent within three years. Moreover,
as evidenced fi*om the compulsory liquidation statistics produced in
Table 1, rates of failure are dramatically increased during economic
recessions.
However, even for well-established firms, business risk can still be
expected to be high since it is likely that they will be characterized by
one or more operational, organizational and/or informational
deficiencies. Operational factors which are both typical of many small
firms and which can be expected to increase business risk include a low
degree of product and/or market diversification, reliance upon relatively
few customers and/or suppliers and, therefore, limited market power.
Additional financial contracting difficulties arise due to the ownermanager’s dual roles as the sole managerial resource and the main equity
investor. The lack of a full management team, often also associated with
the lack of any clear succession once the owner-manager retires, renders
the future viability of the enterprise wholly contingent upon the
continued good health, energies, business acumen and financial probity
of the owner-manager (Keasey & Watson, 1993).
The above characteristics tend to limit the range of possible sources
of finance and, not surprisingly, a number of government sponsored
Committees of Inquiry (Bolton, 1971; Macmillan Committee, 1931;
Wilson, 1979) have concluded that an economically important ‘equity
finance gap’ exists in respect of unlisted small firms. Consequendy, due
to the absence of willing outside equity investors, UK small firms are
almost totally dependent upon short-term bank loans and overdrafts to
finance their investment and operational requirements once the owners’
wealth resources have been fully committed.
The lack of publicly traded equity or debt creates considerable
uncertainty regarding the value of small firm assets and financial claims.
Clearly, a major difficulty for outside creditors is that the closely-held,
owner-managed, firm is almost inevitably going to create severe
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information asymmetries which may be difficult and/or excessively costly
to overcome. In this context the financial reporting requirements
applicable to UK small firms compound the problem since they are
considerably less onerous and less vigorously enforced than is the case
for widely-held, publicly-listed enterprises (Keasey & Watson, 1988).
The lack of readily available market price and accounting
information can, therefore, be expected to generate high information
and exit costs for investors wishing to realize their investment. Such
information asymmetries are a major source of agency costs since it
provides opportunities for owner-managers to take actions which may be
detrimental to the financial claims of other stakeholders. Moreover, as
subsequent sections will indicate, the incentives for the owner-manager to
gamble with outside investors’ claims are greatly enhanced when, for
whatever reason, the firm becomes financially distressed. As both the
choice of what projects to undertake once the necessary finance has been
acquired and decisions regarding the level and pattern of ownermanager withdrawals of equity (via remuneration and/or dividend
payments) are under the control of the owner-manger, traditional
performance measures such as accounting profits, even if available, will
generally be of limited relevance to an outside investor. An outside
investor’s security will normally be restricted to the net realizable value of
the firm’s tangible assets. Only these funds (net of any realization costs)
will typically be available for distribution to creditors in the event of
business failure. This implies that, unless alternative control mechanisms
are available, unsecured outside shareholders, debt suppliers and trade
creditors will have to incur non-trivial monitoring and information costs.
III.

MODELS OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTING
The Debt Contract

The central feature of a debt contract is that it is meant to be a
legally enforceable agreement which ensures that the debt supplier
obtains a prespecified rate of return and schedule of repayments from
the debtor irrespective of the financial circumstances and returns that
accrue to the latter. During the life of the contract, the basic problem for
the creditor is how to ensure that the previously agreed return is
obtained if the debtors’ financial circumstances deteriorate to the point
where default becomes a possibility. In this situation, because of the
(downward) truncated return distribution associated with limited
liability, owner-managers’ incentives become distorted due to the low
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value of their equity claims. Thus, when firms are financially distressed
their owner-managers do not bear the full costs of their decisions and
this provides an incentive to gamble with creditor claims.
As Black and Scholes (1973) have indicated, because of limited
liability, the payoff function to a risk neutral owner-manager of a levered
firm is analogous to that of a call option:
(1)

M a x [ V t - ( l +i)Lt.i,0]

where Vf is the value of the firm at time t, Lf_i is the amount owing to
outside investors (primarily trade creditors and banks) at i - 1 and i is
the effective interest rate on the outstanding liabilities for the period t 1 to t. This, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have noted, is a convex function
which, because of the restricted downside potential, motivates the ownermanager to act in a more risk preferring manner. Quite simply, in the
event of failure (that is when
- (1 +
< 0 ) ^n ‘uncompensated
wealth transfer’ will occur since part of the cost of failure (that is,
(1 + i)L(_i - V() will be borne by the creditors. Thus, whenever default
becomes a possibility (i.e., £{¥() < (1 + i)Lf.i), the owner-manager has an
incentive to take actions which expose creditors to greater risks and
which further reduce the value of their financial claims.
To illustrate some of the main ex post difficulties faced by the debt
supplier, assume for simplicity that no new liabilities or new equity has
been injected over the period ^-1 to t. In this situation, the value of the
firm at the end of the period, Vf, is simply a function of the value of the
firm at ^ - 1 (Vt-i), the profitability of the firm (P^) and the ownermanagers’ drawings {D^ over the period:
(2)

Vt=Vt.^+Pt-Dt.
However, since

+ Lf_i, the above can be expressed as:

(3)

Vt = Et_i + L f . i + P t - D t .

Clearly, in order for the firms’ creditors to be fully paid, that is, for it
to be worthwhile for the owner-manager to exercise his/her call option at
time t (i.e., to repay the debt), the end of period equity {£() must be
greater than zero. Thus, the following condition must hold:
(£,.1 + L,.i + P t - Dt) - (1 +

> 0

(4)

The Bank Financing of Small Unlisted Firms in the UK

- D t > 0.

149

(5)

Hence, from the above, it is clear that the probabihty of default can
be expected to increase as the initial equity position (£/.i) and expected
profitability (P^) fall and when the initial debt level
the interest rate
on the debt (i), and owner-manager drawings (Z)^) increase. It is
im portant to note, however, that at the time of the decision to lend L at
< - 1, the outside creditor will only be able to directly observe E^.i and
i-M- He/she will, at best, only have historic track records and/or forecast
figures regarding both
and Df.
Although information regarding likely profitability in the coming
period, P^, may be available at i - 1, the actual value of the firm at time t
may turn out to be very different from that anticipated. This could occur
if the owner-manager decided to choose a project with a different riskreturn profile and/or he/she significantly changed the pattern and level
of his/her drawings over the period f - 1 to
In addition,
may be
significandy adversely effected by exogenous changes in macroeconomic
conditions. The potential for conflicts of interest to arise is, therefore,
gready increased during economic downturns and this further increases
the incentives for ovmer-managers to act in a m anner which results (by
accident or design) in a shift in the distribution of business risk onto the
creditor.
Given the above, a debt contract will normally contain some provision
which relieves the original owner of control when he/she no longer bears
the full costs of his/her decisions, that is, when the firm is perceived to be
financially distressed. Indeed, from the perspective of the debt supplier,
the essence of an efficient debt contract is that the allocation of control,
but not the return, is contingent upon a measure of firm activity.
Basically, the owner-manager remains in control if the measured activity
is “good” while the outside investor takes control if it is “bad.” The debt
contract, by specifying the point at which control of the enterprise
changes, implicidy determines the point of insolvency. By creating
through the debt contract an ex ante mechanism of control transfer, the
contracting parties have effectively made financial distress endogenous—
financial distress being merely those “bad” states where the contracting
parties have ex ante agreed to transfer control to the outside investor
(see Berglofif, 1990 for a review). Of course, in practice, because of the
closely-held organizational form and other contracting difficulties
associated with small firms, non-trivial information asymmetries will
normally exist. In the absence of owner-manager co-operation, an
outside investor may therefore find it difficult to become sufficiently well-
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informed at an early enough stage to avoid sustaining substantial
uncompensated losses. Such a view appears to underlie the theoretical
credit rationing models discussed below.
Credit Rationing Models
In recent years theoretical asymmetric information models have
increasingly been used to examine financing problems. Most of these
models have also come to the conclusion that credit rationing of one
form or another will exist if lenders are unable to overcome such
information asymmetries (e.g., see De Meza & Webb, 1990). Information
asymmetries can be of three forms-adverse selection, moral hazard and
costly state verification. Adverse selection occurs when borrowers differ
with respect to the probability of repaying their loan and the banks are
unable to judge the probability of an individual loan being repaid. The
banks, therefore, have to offer a blanket rate of interest to all loan
applicants. However, as the rate of interest on loans may affect the
average quality of loan applicants (e.g., low risk borrowers may exit the
market if interest rates rise) this asymmetry of information may lead to
credit rationing as banks attempt to imperfectly classify borrowers into
different categories and choose not to charge a market clearing loan rate
which may lead to an overall worsening of the pool of loan applicants.
The problem of moral hazard in relation to the provision of finance
focuses on the effect that high interest rates may have upon the
unobservable behavior of the firm and the project undertaken with the
loan. For example, if lenders attempt to cover potential losses simply by
charging higher interest rates, this could induce firms to undertake
riskier projects and, therefore, as in the adverse selection situation, the
banks may choose to ration funds via methods other than a market
clearing rate of interest. Thus, the asymmetry of information in either
the adverse selection or moral hazard case concerns the riskiness of the
project for which a loan is used rather than the eventual outcome of a
project.
In contrast to the situations of adverse selection and moral hazard,
costly state verification occurs where the lenders know as much as the
borrowers about the riskiness of the projects being fiinded, but only the
borrower is able to observe his project returns costlessly (see Williamson,
1986, 1987). In this situation the firm has an incentive to declare a
return so low as to make it impossible to pay off the debt to the bank,
even if the return is actually far higher. Banks respond to this incentive
by committing themselves to incur costly monitoring of the project
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returns of firms that file for bankruptcy^/insolvenq^. As for adverse
selection and moral hazard, however, the banks have an incentive not to
charge a market clearing rate of interest. This is because the probability
of bankruptcy is a positive function of the rate of interest and the banks
will need to balance the increased monitoring costs with the increased
monies achieved from higher rates of interest.
All of the above explanations of credit rationing rely upon
information asymmetries and changes in the rate of interest adversely
affecting the quality of the loan portfolio or the costs of monitoring. This
has the consequence that banks have to imperfectly ration loans through
means other than the rate of interest. AJthough the credit rationing
literature has added a degree of mathematical rigor to the analysis of
credit decisions, it is, however, deficient in capturing the nature of the
relationship between small firms and banks. First, as a general point, the
results of the theoretical models are not robust to plausible changes in
important assumptions. For example, the common result of an
underinvestment equilibrium was overturned by De Meza and Webb
(1987) simply by changing the assumption that all projects have the same
mean return. Second, the analysis assumes the relationship takes place
solely via a standard debt contract with a known probability of default.
Thus, although the banks are able to optimally adjust the interest rate
they charge on loans, they have no other contract instruments under
their control. Interestingly, when Bester (1987) included a collateral
requirement in his model, he was able to derive an equilibrium free of
the normal credit rationing conclusions. This is because assets used as
collateral with a net realizable value at least equal to the face value of the
debt, is analogous to a put option which guarantees that the lender will
receive the expected payoff irrespective of what happens to the ex post
profitability of the firm (that is, P<). If the debt is also short-term and/or
subject to frequent review, then the lender effectively has an “American
put option” which can be exercised at any time throughout the loan
period. Moreover, if the assets used as collateral are the borrower’s
personal (i.e., non-business) assets, then the lender need not be
concerned with the borrower’s withdrawals of equity (that is,
either.
T his solution to the contractual difficulties associated with small firm
lending, does not require significant expenditures on risk assessment or
the close monitoring of the borrower’s actions. Also, because the
collateral requirem ent safeguards the lender’s investment, it can be
expected to increase the availability of debt finance and/or lower its costs
significandy.
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If the ability to provide collateral is, however, a function of wealth
and borrowers are risk averse, Stiglitz and Weiss (1987) have shown that
relying exclusively upon a collateral requirement will not be sufficient to
avoid credit rationing or the issues of adverse selection and moral
hazard. Where competition between lenders is active, it might be
expected that firms with insufficient collateral would be willing to bear
the costs of monitoring and higher interest rates that incorporated the
correct assessment and pricing of risk. If, however, current lending
institutions are geared exclusively towards providing loans on a put
option basis, this change in lending policy would require lending
institutions to invest heavily in acquiring the specialized knowledge and
skills necessary to undertake meaningful risk assessment and the
monitoring of the borrower’s business decisions. The probable high setup
costs associated with such a change in lending arrangements may prevent
it from happening, particularly if lenders perceive that they will be
unlikely to recoup these costs from borrowers without causing adverse
selection problems which results in significantly increasing the riskiness
of their loan portfolio.
The above discussion indicates that the theoretical credit rationing
models are not institutionally rich and are, therefore, limited as an aid to
understanding the empirical relationships between small firms and
banks. Not surprisingly, given the mathematical complexities of the
credit rationing models, there is a relative absence of empirical work
which can directly test the various implications of different models. One
notable exception is the work by Berger and Udell (1989). Their results
reveal substantial rigidities in commercial loan rates and this is consistent
with the presence of credit rationing. However, they present additional
evidence which suggests that the quantitative impact of credit rationing is
likely to be relatively small and furthermore, the rigidities in interest
rates were found to vary with contract details counter to the conclusions
of the general credit rationing models. The evidence of Berger and
Udell suggests, therefore, that other models of the bank financing of
small firms might be usefully developed and explored. The emphasis of
recent developments in the theoretical literature has been to alter the
assumptions made regarding borrower characteristics—the type of
returns distribution, the risk preferences of the borrowers, etc. To date,
the (organizational, market or regulatory) characteristics of the lenders
have played little or no part in these models. In other words, the credit
rationing models have been largely driven from the demand side with
the supply side being characterized as a ‘responsive’ perfectly competitive
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situation, a characterisation which does not appear to be empirically well
founded for the UK.
T he UK Secured Bank O verdraft System
The majority of debt finance from the main clearing banks to small
businesses is advanced using the secured overdraft/short-term loan
system. As already noted, this solution adopted by the UK banks to the
contractual problems outiined above is analogous to their purchase of a
“put option” with an exercise price set equal to the outstanding debt
+ i)), assumed to be lower than the net realizable value of the
collaterised assets. With this system, at any time after the loan has been
provided, the bank has the ability to call-in the loan (an “American” put)
and be paid in full ahead of all other financial claims. This protects the
bcmk from down-side business risks, requires litde monitoring or risk
assessment and allows the banks to charge significantly lower interest rate
premia (approximately 2 percentage points lower) on secured small
business lending (see Keasey & Watson, 1995).
The other main characteristic of the overdraft system is its
“flexibility” which, in normal circumstances, has benefits for both parties.
Normally, the borrower negotiates an ‘overdraft limit’ with the local
branch manager. This then allows checks to be drawn at any time on a
current account in excess of the fiinds available up to this limit. Hence,
the actual amount borrowed will vary depending upon what checks the
account holder draws or deposits in this account. As noted earlier, the
major advantage of the overdraft system for the borrower vis-a-vis a fixed
term loan is its flexibility. Interest is only charged on the amount by
which the account is overdrawn and there is no fixed repayment
schedule. One advantage to the bank is that the interest rates charged on
outstanding balances can be varied contractually at the bank’s discretion.
Although legally the overdraft facility could be withdrawn at any
time, the banks normally allow a reasonable period of notice to enable
the firm to obtain finance elsewhere before requiring either a reduction
in the overdraft limit or the repayment of the total balance. In ‘normal’
circumstances, it is extremely rare for a bank to withdraw an overdraft
facility, this is after all a fairly profitable line of business for the banks. In
consequence, the financial planning of many small firms is frequently
based on the assumption that their overdraft limit represents a
perm anent source of long-term capital. This behavior rarely appears to
be a cause for concern in periods of economic prosperity, provided that
the firm stays within its agreed overdraft limit and is able to service the
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interest payments. However, major problems surface when an economic
downturn occurs and the firm is either unable to stay within its overdraft
limit or, because of the poorer prospects for the firm, is required by the
bank to make arrangements to reduce its overdraft by some significant
amount.
IV. RELATIONSHIPS AND THE
STRUCTURE OF UK BANKING
Small Firm Banking Relationships

The structure of banking within the UK and how this impacts upon
the small firm/bank relationship is now considered. In examining the
history and structure of banking within the UK, major differences with
banking in the US are noted where appropriate. The discussion indicates
that the market and organizational structures of banking can be expected
to have an impact on the relationship betwreen the small firm and the
bank. The work of Petersen and Raj an (1994), who show that the
closeness of a relationship impacts upon the availability of loans, is
discussed before going on to consider how the structure of banking
affects the closeness of small firm/bank relationships in the US and the
UK.
Petersen and Rajan’s notion of a relationship is that long-term or
close/intense relationships provide more information to the parties
about each other. For example, with a long-term ‘relationship’, bank
lenders will be better able to judge the risk characteristics of a specific
loan. The ability of a relationship to overcome information asymmetries
is basically a function of its duration and its scope. Hence the longer a
relationship has been in existence, the better the lender should be able
to judge the risk characteristics of a further loan proposal. Equally, where
a relationship involves a range of products, the lender should have more
information on which to base his/her loan decisions.
Whether the benefits of such increased information (via an improved
pool of lending decisions) is passed on to the borrower depends upon
competition in the market place for capital; which in turn depends on
the specific forms of the relational information and the market place. If
the information available from the relationship is purely private and
cannot be accessed by other external lenders, then it is doubtful whether
it will necessarily lead to a lower cost of loans—the rents being extracted
by an essentially monopoly provider. However, the monopoly provider
may be more willing to provide funds under this increased information
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situation. Hence, even if relationships do not lower the costs of funds to
small firms, they may increase the availability of loans. This latter
proposition is supported by the empirical evidence reported by Petersen
and Rajan which indicated that the presence of a long-term relationship
was associated with an increased availability of finance.
The structure of the lending market may influence the formation of
particular types of relationship and/or have an effect upon the duration
and scope of relationships. The one empirical fact to come out of the
Petersen and Rajan study, and this supports the argument of Mayer
(1988), is that concentration in a local market is beneficial to the
development of a close relationship which allows the bank to reap the
benefits of being ‘helpful’ at an early stage of the relationship.
Furthermore, concentration in a local market is more likely to lead to a
durable relationship with wider scope because of a lack of viable
alternatives. However, in a non-competitive situation there are few
incentives for lenders to incur the costs associated with obtaining a more
adequate understanding of the risk characteristics of borrowers if default
costs are solely borne by the latter. Indeed, in this situation, the costs of
information gathering would be a deadweight cost without any
corresponding benefit to the lender.
Elliehausen and Wolken’s (1990) research on the use of banking
services by small and medium sized firms in the US found that small
enterprises obtained virtually all their financial services from local (within
a 30 mile radius) financial institutions. Moreover, Elliehausen and
Wolken suggest that, because the local commercial banks provided
multiple services, they were the single most important financial
institution for nearly every small and medium sized business throughout
the US. The emphasis upon the local bank clearly has an impact on the
type of relationship that might endure between small firms and banks,
liie local banker will have a greater personal knowledge of his/her
customers and their business affairs. On both these grounds, he/she may
be able to accept classes of business which the large institution, without
an intimate knowledge of the locality, may see as too risky to take on
province. In this way, the local bank may be able, at least in part, to
offset the advantage held by larger institutions in securing a wider spread
of risks—^both regionally and as between industries; whether the larger
banks effect this by a means of branch networks or an agency of
correspondents. Thus the advantage enjoyed by small-scale, local US
banks is the ability to maintain a relationship through a detailed
knowledge of specific circumstances and enjoying the flexibility to adjust
policies accordingly.
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The UK Banking System
The UK banking system is quite different in structure to that of the
US. The system is based on four major clearing banks (National
Westminster, Lloyds, Midland and Barclays) who operate nationwide via
an extensive branch network. O f course, in any one geographic location
there may be more ‘competition’ between branches of the ‘Big 4’, in
terms of the range of services provided, than is the case for the local unit
bank system of the US. However, by any criteria, banking in the UK is
highly concentrated and this has consequences for small firm/bank
financial contracts and relationships.
Even so, since 1980 the UK banking sector has faced increased
domestic and international competition due to several public policy
initiatives that have significantly altered the economic and regulatory
environment within which they operate. For example, the abolition of
exchange controls has opened up the UK domestic market to
international competition, while financial deregulation legislation has
allowed other financial institutions (such as building societies) to offer a
full range of banking facilities including the provision of current
accounts. As a consequence the UK banks were no longer able to rely
upon an uncompetitive domestic market to supply them with a cheap
source of funds from non-interest bearing current accounts. This, along
with the 1987 Basle Agreement which increased the minimum capital
adequacy ratios of banks, significantly increased the costs of making
loans.
As profit margins on lending were squeezed, the banks competed
more vigorously in terms of the prices of their other services. This led to
the elimination of implicit cross-subsidisation and to the passing on to
the customer of the costs of supplying specific services. Hence, while
those customers with deposits gained from a more competitive rate of
interest, charges for many other services had to be introduced and/or be
increased to reflect the marginal cost of supplying these services. This, as
might be expected, made banks unpopular with customers who
previously obtained these services free or at a subsidised rate (see
Chrystal, 1992).
Despite these environmental changes, and in spite of much criticism
firom small business representatives when the bank uses its put option,
the secured overdraft still remains the primary form of bank lending to
small firms in the UK. Although more competition within the UK
banking sector could haye led to more sophisticated financing this has
not been the case. Rather increased competition has simply resulted in
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an increased willingness to provide secured overdraft finance (see The
Bank of England (1991) for empirical evidence). This can be explained
by at least two factors; an inability and/or unwillingness of small firm
owner-managers to obtain external equity financing and/or to
countenance a greater bank involvement with their businesses (see
Cowling, Samuels, & Sugden, 1991) and the lack of incentives for the
major UK clearing banks to change their lending policies.
An obvious advantage to the banks of overdraft financing is that it
limits the judgem ent required in lending because branch managers only
have to assess the adequacy of the assets used as security and the ability
of borrowers to repay in a short time. Relatively unsophisticated lending
criteria can be used as there is no need to assess the longer term
profitability of the business. Hence, the expected incremental benefits of
improved information flows associated with the development of close
relationships with borrowers are unlikely to be sufficient to give the
banks a strong incentive to change their lending practices in this
direction. Moreover, as in most oligopolistic markets, there are big
disincentives for any one player to step out of line with what other
players are doing. The concentrated structure of UK banking is at least
partially responsible for the highly stable (though with occasional bouts
of “follow-the-leader” behavior) and essentially identical lending
behavior observed across the main banks.
Another major disincentive to change is that the secured overdraft
system, because it does not need highly developed lending or risk
assessment skills, fits in extremely well with the existing appointment and
career promotion systems of, what are essentially, nationwide,
hierarchically organised, retail banks. This nationwide retail structure
requires managers to be sifted for promotion up a long hierarchy.
Temporarily occupying a number of positions from branch manager and
below in a number of different geographic areas appears to be an
essential part of this internal labor market process. The use of overdraft
finance facilitates this internal labor market process because the bank
manager only needs to respond to the national headquarters’ edicts
regarding changes in lending policies. Although the branch manager has
some discretion in deciding when to call in an overdraft, a dispassionate
distance in the relationship may be an advantage as personal
commitment is not allowed to cloud the issue. Thus, the arms length
nature of overdraft financing facilitates the career processing needs of
the highly concentrated, hierarchical retail banking sector and this
concentrated retail-based structure prevents major changes in lending
behavior.
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As with Other oligopolistic industries, UK banking regularly exhibits
“follow the leader” behavior in that the ‘Big 4’ closely track each other in
terms of their market actions. A recent example of this was the increased
attention by all four banks on small firms in the mid to late 1980s which
resulted in the ‘Big 4’ clearing banks greatly increasing their total
funding to a greatly increased UK small firm sector. The banks were able
to do this because any significant changes in the risks associated with
competing in this market place would largely be borne by the small firms
themselves. Thus when the recession came in the early 1990s and the
assumptions of the boom years of the mid to late 1980s did not
materialise, the banks simply responded as they had always responded
and withdrew or reduced their overdraft facilities to firms which
appeared to be entering financial difficulties. However, not surprisingly,
this calling in of overdraft finance by the banks in the early 1990s has led
to conflict and extensive complaints by small business representatives
who argued that the banks have a responsibility to lend on a sound basis
and to maintain lending to allow businesses to ride out any temporary
financial difficulties.
Empirical Evidence
To illustrate how the structure of UK banking and the extensive use
of secured overdrafts has impacted upon small firm/bank relationships,
this section briefly reviews the available empirical evidence on the bank
financing of UK small firms. A study of the bank financing of a sample of
110 small firms by Keasey and Watson (1992) indicated that bank finance
and owners’ equity provided almost equal proportions (about 31% each)
of the overall funding of small firms in 1990. Furthermore, 55 percent of
the total funding of small firms was short term, with the banks and trade
creditors each providing roughly a third of this short term finance. Of
the longer term bank finance, approximately a third was unsecured. The
majority of both the bank overdrafts and longer term loans were secured
on either just the directors’ personal assets or a combination of business
and personal assets. The average security ratio of assets to loans was
slightly under three, which is remarkably similar to the figures reported
by both Cowling et al (1991) and Binks, Ennew, and Yead (1992). The
study also indicated an increased reliance upon short-term debt relative
to equity over the expansionary period to 1990 and this certainly
increased the vulnerability of firms to the subsequent economic
downturn. This increased reliance upon short term debt is also reported
by the Bank of England (1991). Basically, there is ovenvhelming evidence

The Bank Financing of Small Unlisted Firms in the UK

159

Table 1
UK Macroeconomic Indicators: 1985 to 1992
(4th Quarter Figures)
Company
Liquidations—
England and

Notes:

UK FT AllShare Index

Rate of UK
Wholly
Unemployed

UK* GDP

Rate of Change
in House
Prices—
Yorkshire

Year

Wafes)

1985

14.898

682.9

11.0

86.1

5.2

1986

14,405

835.5

11.1

90.4

7.2

1987

11,439

870.2

9.3

94.5

9.4

1988

9,427

926.6

7.4

98.6

40.4

1989

10,456

1,204.7

5.8

99.8

24.2

1990

15,051

1,032.3

6.3

99.1

1.3

1991

21,827

1,187.7

8.9

97.5

-0.1

1992

24,425

1,363.8

10.4

97.7

-4.1

*June 1990 = 100.0
House Price series provided by the Halifax Building Society.
The rest of the series are taken from Datastream.

that the major clearing banks in the UK played a major part in fuelling,
on the back of overdraft financing, the growth of the small firm sector
and general boom conditions in the UK economy during the late 1980s
(see Table 1).
The study by Keasey and Watson (1992) also indicated that the
clearing banks, in their haste to chase available business during the mid
to late 1980s, had left themselves increasingly exposed to an economic
downturn. Thus although the average profitability of the sample was
consistently high over the six year period up to 1991 (for instance, in
1990 the average profits before interest payments and directors fees as a
percentage of turnover was approximately 16%), in each year directors’
fees were approximately some 70 percent of total operating profits. Since
this represents funds withdrawn from the business, it is clear that
typically only a small proportion of the firms’ earnings will be directly
available for satisfying claims of creditors. Nevertheless, the banks can be
expected to be most concerned with the security^ of the lending rather
than with the firm’s profitability. This is supported by the empirical
findings of Keasey and Watson (1995) who found that the risk premia
charged by banks on small firm overdrafts/loans were positively related to
firm specific risk factors such as leverage and a lack of asset backed
security.
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With the onset of the recession in the early 1990s, the earlier dash by
the major banks for small firm lending was replaced by a concern over
the poor quality of the past lending to small firms. As can be seen fi"om
Table 1, during 1990 property prices and GDP fell and dramatic
increases in the number of company liquidations occurred. Since
property was the basis of the banks’ put option, overdrafts were called in
or limits tightened, which further increased the number of small business
failures. Keasey and Watson (1995) also found that small firm interest
rate premia increased by approximately three percent as the UK
economy turned towards recession after 1990.
V.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has considered the nature of small firm/bank relationships in
the UK. It has been argued that the relationship can only be understood
if three factors are borne in mind-the special nature of small firms and
their operating environment, the structure of banking in the UK and its
use of overdraft financing, and the impact the general macro-economy
has on the relationship. During 1991, the main UK clearing banks were
on the receiving end of a lot of criticism fi’om small businesses,
particularly those experiencing financial difficulties. The criticisms were
wide ranging and included claims of insensitivity over the handling of
small firm accounts, over-charging in terms of interest payments, of
applying bank charges without informing the customer, being overly
eager in calling in their loans and demanding too high a level of security.
The media and small business pressure groups were not slow to take up
these issues and even the ‘quality’ newspapers devoted several pages to
the ‘horror stories’ recounted by small business owners. Now that the
media interest in the issue has diminished, it has become obvious that
the main cause of the large increases in small business failures was the
recessionary impact of the government’s high interest rate monetary
policy. Although the Cowling et al (1991) and Binks et al (1992) studies
were critical of the banks on some counts, both reached similar
conclusions.
In reply to the accusation of abusing their monopoly power by
increasing their margins on small firm lending precisely when firms were
most financially vulnerable, the banks have argued that this simply
reflects their increased monitoring costs and greater exposure to business
risk in economic downturns. The recently published evidence from
surveys of small business owners (Cowling et al, 1991 and Binks et al,
1992), however, indicate that most small firms pay interest rates only
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some 2-4 percent above base rates and that bank margins on small firm
lending have increased only marginally as the recession deepened.
Perhaps the major source of recent concern has been the perception that
a significant number of small firms have failed because the banks were
too ready to call in the receivers whenever any hint of financial problems
came to light. These concerns were inevitably fuelled during 1991 and
1992 by the downturn in macroeconomic activity because, as Chrystal
(1992) has noted:
“Money lenders have had a bad press in recessions ever since Biblical
times. In this regard, banks do not cause the problem—rather it is the
inevitable outcome of a business downturn. The bank simply conveys the
news that negative cash flow cannot go on for ever.”
It could be argued that the banks’ concern with protecting the
security of their investments merely reflects the nature of the debt
contract—blenders do not share in upside potential and, therefore, do not
expect to becir any uncompensated downside risks. However, it needs to
be emphasized that it is the concentrated structure of banking within the
UK that has allowed the banks to compete via an increased provision of
relatively safe overdraft finance rather than longer terms loans or hybrid
sources of finance. In other words, some of the responsibility for the
recent financial problems facing the small firm sector must lay with the
relatively indiscriminate expansion of small firm funding via overdraft
financing. The costs incurred by the banks themselves over the recent
recession from small firm failures has led to pronouncements that future
fimding will be more cognizant of the specific characteristics of
individual loans.
None the less, it would be unfair to see the relationships between
small firms and banks being driven purely from side of the banks.
Perhaps the only method by which conflicts between small firms and
banks could be reduced would be if small firms secured more external
equity finance. There is, of course, no guarantee that if equity risk capital
were made available via the market that the contractual arrangements
with small businesses would be any more agreeable to them. Indeed, part
of the apparent conflict between small firms and banks in the UK exists
precisely because small firm owners are unwilling to bind themselves to
agreements that require them to share control and upside gains with
external equity suppliers. This certainly appears to be the case judging
by the highly negative attitudes expressed by small business ownermanagers towards the possibility of equity holdings by banks (see
Cowling et al., 1991).
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